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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

KRISTE A. PITKIN,

*

Plaintiff and
Appellant,

*

vs.

Case no. 14588

PRESTON'S INCORPORATED and
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
UTAH,

*
*

Defendants and
Respondents,

*

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant is appealing from an Order of the Industrial
Commission of Utah denying comepnsation to Appellant under
Workmen's Compensation provisions of the Utah Code Annotated
[hereinafter cited as U.C.A.].
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of the Order of the
Industrial Commission and a determination of the disability,
suffered by Appellant, under provisions of U.C.A.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
At the time the injury was sustained, Appellant was
a 2 3-year-old female employed by Defendant, Preston's Incorporated
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owners of a bus station in Logan, Utah.

Her period of employment

was from the 17th day of December, 1973, until the 9th day
of December, 1974, at which time she was terminated.

Her duties

included selling tickets for Greyhound bus lines, occasionally
cashiering at the cafe, and handling freight, some of which
weighed one hundred pounds (T.R. 9). More specifically, her
handling of freight included lifting outgoing freight or baggage
onto carts, removing incoming freight from the carts, and retrievi
freight for customers.
While lifting freight on or about the 2 8th day of
August, 1974, Appellant suffered an acute attack of back
pain which radiated down her left leg.

Appellant did not

recognize that the leg pain was associated with her back
injury until the 5th day of September when she was told by
Dr. Russell N. Hirst that she was probably suffering from
an "early disc".

Later, at an employees' party, Appellant

informed Respondent corporation's president, Patrick Preston
that she had a ruptured disc (T.R.42).
Dr. Hirst referred Appellant to Dr. James M. Steele
who diagnosed her injury as a herniated nucleus pulposis L5
SI on the left or a herniated disc. (See Exhibit A-l).
In November, a claim was filed with the Industrial
Commission placing the date of injury on September, 19, 1974,
"over a period of time working caused by lifting freight".
Subsequent to the filing, Appellant contacted counsel who
instructed her to try to remember the exact date and time of
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the accident (T.R. 45, 46). As a result she determined that it
occurred on or about the 28th day of August, 1974. An amended
complaint was filed alleging the 2 8th day of August.

Appellant

continued working until she was terminated on December 9, 1974.
A hearing was held in the Hearing Room of the
Industrial Commission of Jtah on March 19, 1975 pursuant to
Order and Notice of the Industrial Commission.

The two

witnesses who testified at the hearing in addition to Appellant
were Patrick Preston and Heather Hardy.
ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

The Industrial Commission acted arbitrarily in

not considering or acting upon the testimony of
witnesses when such testimony is substantial,
credible, and uncontradicted.
2.

Appellant's failure to promptly report her

injury does not bar compensation.
3.

The Industrial Commission erred in not finding

that, as a matter of law, the Applicant did sustain
an industrial injury by accident in the course of
her employment, despite her inability to recall
the precise time and occurrence responsible for
said injury.
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ARGUEMENT
ISSUE NO. 1
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ACTED ARBITRARILY IN
NOT CONSIDERING OR ACTING UPON THE TESTIMONY OF
WITNESSES WHEN SUCH TESTIMONY IS SUBSTANTIAL,
CREDIBLE, AND UNCONTRADICTED.
It is evident from the Industrial Commission's
findings that Appellant's claim of disability resulting from
a back injury is undisputed.

The primary question is whether

the injury was sustained by accident in the course of
Appellant's employment.

Consistent with legislative intent,

this Court has liberally construed provisions for employees'
right to compensation under the Workmen's Compensation (see
Chandler v. Industrial Commission, 55 Utah 213, 184 P. 1020).
"This court is committed to the rule that as a matter of law
the Commission may not, without any reason or cause, arbitrarily
or capriciously refuse to believe and act upon substantial,
competent and credible evidence which is uncontradicted.11
Baker v. Industrial Commission, 17 Utah 2d 141, 405 P.2d 613,
614-15 (1965) and cases cited therein.
In the instant case Appellant testified that the
accident occurred on or about the 28th day of August, at which
time she suffered low back and sciatic pain.

She did not

realize that this sciatic pain was associated with her back
injury until the 5th day of September when she was examined
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by Dr. Hirst.

She then informed at least two people of her

injury at an employees1 party.

One was Heather Hardy, a

fellow employee and the other was Patrick H. Preston, President
of Preston's Inc.
No formal report of the injury was made to Respondent
corporation due to its failure to produce any Industrial Insurance
and its lack of assistance to employees relative to claims
and notice of injury forms. (T.R. 42, 43)

Notwithstanding

the above, Respondent did not even commence an investigation,
despite the fact that Preston was informed of the accidental
injury only eight days after the approximate date of injury.
Further, Appellant did inquire about Workmen's Compensation
benefits on the 19th day of September subsequent to being
examined by Dr. Steele (T.R. 31,36).
In the instant case, acknowledgement of corroborative
evidence given by the two witnesses who testified at the hearing
on March 19th is conspicuously absent from the Findings. Both
Preston and Hardy testified and substantiated Appellant1s
testimony concerning the issues of the time Appellant incurred
her injury, the apparent nature of the injury, and when Respondent
corporation was informed of the accidental injury.
Heather Hardy, who was still employed by Preston's
Inc. at the time of the hearing, testified that in August she
personally observed Appellant limp after the last week in August.
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MR. PRESTON Q Do you recall anything that she
specifically said to you during that month?
A

No

Q

Concerning her back I mean?

A

Not until after she had talked to Dr. Hirst.

0 I see. So that was the first time that you heard
anything concerning her back, was when she talked to
Dr. Hirst?
A Well, we had discussed leg pain, but we didn't
know it was her back.
Q When did she first discuss the fact that she had
leg pain?
A She didn't have to.
limping.
Q

I brought it up.

She was

What date was that?

A Sometime during the last week in August.
know what day.
Q

I don't

How do you know it was the last week of August?

A Because it was about a week after I had returned
from a trip home to California the first of August.
Q

Did she complain of leg pain?

A Uh-huh. She was limping and she'd sit down, and
she couldn't stand straight up after sitting for a
while (T.R. 66 1 1-23).
Q But as near as you can pinpoint, did you first
start noticing the pain that she was apparently
sutfering in her leg?
A

It was the last week of August.
MR. PRESTON:

That's all (T.R. 93 1 18-22).
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This testimony clearly substantiated Appellant's
statements concerning the time of her injury.

It also focuses

on the differences between normal backaches of which nearly
all employees complained and the very serious nature of the
herniated disc Appellant suffered.

It is clear that such

testimony should have been considered both in relation to the
time and occurrance of the accident and to the issue of Appellant's
credibility.
Heather Hardy further verified both that she had
been told of the injury on September 5th and that Earl Halverson
was informed on September 19th.
MR. PRESTON: Q When did she first tell you that
she hurt it working?
A

She never really did.

Q So this is the first time you have ever heard
that this injury occurred as a result of employment
at Dick's Cafe then?
A No. Because after she had gone to the doctor, and
they had decided that it was her back, and it could
be from lifting the freight. She hadn't been doing
any other strenuous activity, or lifting anything so
(T.R. 67 1 9-17).
Q Do you know whether or not she filed — of your
knowledgef or any other employee, including Earl
Halverson — o f any notice of any injury that she
sustained?
A Not until after she had gone to the doctor on
the 19th.
Q So that was the first time you were aware that
she claimed an injury?
A No. At the employees' party she did bring it up
that she had talked to Dr. Hirst, and he had told
her that he thought it might be a crushed disc.
(T.R. 70 1 10-19).
-7-

Patrick Preston also stated that he had been informed
of Appellant's injury on September 5thf the day of the employees'
party.
MR. PRESTON: O And can you tie any one of these
conversations? The first date that you can place on
a conversation? Can you tell us the approximate
date?
A I can't tell you the approximate date.
it was at the employees' party, however.

I think

Q

When was that, approximately?

A

I don't remember.

Q

Would you tell me what was said at that time?

I'm sure it's in the records.

A I think she said she had a bad back ache at the time.
Now she announced to me that she was going to have an
operation. I don't remember whether it was then. I
don't think so. I think it was sometime in November.
But there again, I'm sorry, but I can't remember a
date.
O

Did she tell you the reason for the bad back?

A No, she didn't tell me any reason for the bad
back. Oh yes. She told me a reason of lifting
freight. I'm not sure that I accept that reason.
MR. LOW: I move to have that stricken, Your Honor.
What difference does it make whether she accepted that
or not?
REFEREE:

Well, for that reason it may stand.
(T.R. 84 1. 17-25, 85 1 1-11)

The Commission should have considered these witnesses'
testimony because it is not bound by the testimony of the
claimant to the exclusion of all other evidence in reaching
its final determination.

Lorange v. Industrial Commission,

107 Utah 261, 153 P.2d 272. Had the Commission considered
-8-

this evidencef the only reasonable conclusion it could have
reached would be that a serious back injury had been sustained
by Appellant during the last week of August on or about the
2 8th day in the course of her employment.
ISSUE NO. 2
APPELLANT'S FAILURE TO PROMPTLY REPORT
HER INJURY DOES NOT BAR COMPENSATION.
Appellant's failure to promptly report her injury
is "not sufficiently consistant with the facts to be ground for
denying compensation where the injury was of the kind that would
ordinarily cause the claimant to think that it would soon heal
and that it would be alright to continue working"

Baker, supra,

at 614. Similarly, in Arizona, the Court of Appeals does
not charge the claimant with the duty of knowing the nature
of his injury before it is determined by a competent medical
investigation.

Employer's Mutual Life Insurance Co. of Wisconsin v.

Industrial Commission, 24 Arizona App. 427, 539 P.2d 541 (1975).
In the instant case, Appellant continued working, testifying
that she did not recognize the pain in her leg as symptomatic
of a back injury until September 5th (T.R. 15, 42, 67, 70).
When she became aware of the seriousness of her injury she
did notify Patrick Preston the same day.
Respondent appears to blame Appellant for failing to
report the accident the day it occurred, despite the fact that
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she did not realize the nature of the accidental injury as
shown above.

Respondent then ignored the fact that no notice

relative to Workmenfs Compensation, no claim forms, no reporting
procedures, nor any evidence of insurance was provided by Respondent
The combination of these things and Appellant's inability to
diagnose her injury are what caused the delay in reporting.
The Code provides, under Section 35-1-99, one year
for notice to be given a reduction for late notice after 4 8
hours if the employer investigates the accident.
took no action.

Respondent

^here is nothing unusual in this case to bar

compensation.
ISSUE NO. 3
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT,
AS A MATTER.OF LAW, THE APPLICANT DID SUSTAIN AN
INDUSTRIAL INJURY BY ACCIDENT IN THE COURSE OF HER
EMPLOYMENT, DESPITE HER INABILITY TO RECALL THE PRECISE
TIME AND OCCURRANCE RESPONSIBLE FOR SAID INJURY.
The major issue arising out of the March 19th hearing
was whether Applicant sustained an "injury by accident" which
can be compensated as provided in U.C.A. 35-1-44.

The

Administrative Law Judge found that Appellant suffered a back
injury, but that the injury developed over a period of time
and, therefore, falls without the statutory definition of
"injury by accident."

On authority of Pintar v. Industrial

Commission of Utah, 14 Utah 2d 276, 282 P.2d 414, the Judge
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held that a claimant must be able to specify an "identifiable
accident or accidents in the course of the employment."

In

holding that a precise act or incident be alleged in order to
receive compensation, the Administrative Law Judge has misconstrued the intent of the Legislature.
This issue focuses on the definition of "injury by accider
A brief review of the history and purpose of Workmen's Compensation
legislation is enlightening.

The English Workmen's Compensation

Law provided compensation for "injury by accident."

The 1903

case of Fenton v. Thornley, 1903 A.C. 443, held that an employee
who ruptured himself by strain in the course of his work was
within the provisions of the statute andf significantly, that
the rupture was unexplained despite intended strain.

The discussio:

of this case and subsequent interpretation in Purity Bisquit
Co. v. Industrial Commissiony 201 P. 2d 961, 967 (Utah, 1949)
is definitive of the proper legislative construction of the
Workmen's Compensation Act.
The opinion recognized that the language of the
statute suggests a separate accidental event which
causes the injury but held that such language
was used loosely and should be construed in its
popular sense. That so construed, all that is
required is that the resulting injury be accidental.
It was said that the distinction between accidental
cause and accidental result was over the heads of
parliament and of employer and employee, and that
the average person would consider he had met with
an accident in either case.
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Under this construction, the "accident" in the instant
case was the rupture of the disc and the result in "injury"
was the pain and restricted ability to sitf stand, and lift.
The opinion further addressed the problem of legislative
intent at page 968 of the text.
This very problem was discussed and legislatures were
advised that if the result reached in Fenton v. Thornley,
supra, was intended, the use of the term "injury by
accident", since its meaning had been construed to
mean only an unexpected result, was desirable. Thereafter, with full access to that decision and article
our legislature enacted our Workmen1s Compensation
Law and adopted the term "injury by accident."
It is a familiar doctrine of statutory construction
that where a legislature adopts a statute which
has already been construed, it usually adopts the
construction placed thereon.
The opinion recognizes that if the policy behind
Workmen's Compensation is to "insure all employees against
disabling accidental injury caused by employment" and "to
prevent expensive litigation and uncertain results" then to hold
that an internal failure, such as a herniated disc, comes within
the statutory requirements in consistent with such intent. Id. at

Thus, the term "injury by accident" embodies, primarily
the element of unexpectedness.

See 44 ALR 36 3, Larson, Workmenf s

Compensation (Desk Ed.) §37.20, 1976.

In the instant case,

this element is satisfied on the authority of Fenton v. Thornley
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which defines an accident as "an unlooked for mishap or an
untoward event which is not expected or designed."

First,

the existence of Appellant's injury is acknowledged in the
findings of the Administrative Law Judge.

Additionally,

the unexpected nature of the injury is confirmed by Appellant,
herself, in response to the Referee's questioning at the hearing
(T.R. 50 1 17-25, 51 1. 1-16).

It is clear that Appellant's

injury was unexpected.
A second element of the term "injury by accident" is
one which has been added by most jurisdictions:

The

injury should be reasonably identifiable as to time and
occurrence.

Larson § 37.20. The Utah cases of Frederickson

v. Industrial Commission, 68 Utah 206, 249 P. 480 and Bamberger
Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 66 Utah 203, 240 P. 1103
hold that an internal failure was not accidental when no
definite time or place of injury was determined.

However,

a case factually similar to the case at bar appears to have
modified this strict interpretation, thus bringing the treatment of like cases in line with the heavy preponderance of jurisdictions which allow compensation for herniated disc
injuries without demanding proof of a particular occasion as
the cause.

See Larson, §38.20.

Commission, supra.
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The case is Baker v. Industrial

In Baker, the claimant was denied compensation by the
Commission for a ruptured disc on the ground that her injury
did not occur in nor did it arise out of her employment as
a clerk-typist.

The order was reversed on appeal, the

state's highest court holding that "[t]he claimant's indefinite
statements concerning the cause of the injury should not be
held to defeat her recovery." (emphasis added) Ijd. , at 614. As
in the case at bar, Claimant's testimony was indefinite as to
the cause of the injury.

Also, the injury, the nature of which

was uncertain until days afterward, was not reported to the
employer until the following week.

Her testimony was also

supported by credible testimony which was either disbelieved
or not considered by the Commission.
The Pintar case, supra, upon which the Commission's
Findings were predicated in the instant case, is inapposite
especially in light of Baker, supra.

In Pintar, supra, the

claimant was suffering from a degenerative arthritic lumbar
spine, and one of the issues appears to have been whether the
injury was an occupational disease and compensable.

In the

present case, Appellant sustained an injury of internal
failure of a disc, there being no question of whether it was
compensable as an occupational disease.

T

he criteria to be

established for an "identifiable accident or accidents"
(Pintar, supra, at 415) in occupational diseases are necessarily

-14-

different from those to establish an "injury by accident."
(compare chapters 1 and 2 of Title 35, U.C.A.)

There is,

therefore, no basis for Pintar as authority under the facts
of this case.
Conceding the fact that herniated discs do sometimes
develop over a period of time, that period of time can be as
short as a couple of hours.
therein.

Larson, §39.10 and cases cited

This fact probably constitutes the reason Appellant

is unable to recall an exact moment or triggering occurrence
of her injury, although she can approximate the week and even
the day she experienced pain.
however.

This inability is not essential,

"The accident consists in the unexpected internal

failure of his system to function normally, ^here is no req lirement
that the accident be the first in the chain of events which ultimately results in injury or that it be an outward force applied
to the employee, all it requires is injury or death by accident."
Purity, supra, at 966. Most recently, in the case of Residential
and. Commercial Construction Co. and State Insurance Fund v.
Industrial Commission of Utah and Gary Lynn Kskelson, 529 P.2d
457 (Utah, 1975), the court held that a lumbosacral strain was
unexpected and compensable despite the fact that the medical
panel found the injury resulted from congenital anomaly instead
of trauma.
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In th<* instant case, the accident was the rupturing
of the disc which caused symptoms of pain.

The pain, resulting

in inability to move and a disability in employment constitutes
the injury.

Thus the requisites of injury by accident are

satisfied under both Purity, supra, and Baker, supra.

Finally,

since the Administrative Law Judge stated that it was the lifting
of freight which contributed significantly to Appellant's injury,
it is clear that, as a matter of law, she sustained an injury
by accident in the course of her employment.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of the Workmen's Compensation Act is
to provide compensatory relief for injuries sustained in the
course of employment.

There is nothing to indicate that the

intent of the Legislature is to compensate only those employees
who can demonstrate an exact time and precise act which caused
their injuries.

Such an interpretation would both arbitratily

deny legitimate claims and facter fabrication of events to
fulfill such requisites.
First, it appears that the Commission, as a fact
finding body, disregarded testimony of a substantial, credible
and competent nature.

There was even testimony from the

president of Respondent corporation to corraborate, not to
discredit, Appellant's testimony.

There is no good cause

why the Commission arbitrarily failed to mention uncontradicted
evidence or record.
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Secondly, Appellant's failure to promptly report
her injury is not a bar to her recovery.

There is nothing

to indicate she had any reason to make specific note of it
until she discussed the matter with counsel.

Certainly her

employer did not aid in her knowledge regarding notice requirements for Workmen's Compensation.

The fact is that Respondent

was not in compliance with U.C.A.35-1-46 requiring some kind
of employee insurance.
Ultimately the facts show that Appellant sustained
an injury by accident on or about the 28th day of August, 1974,
while she was lifting freight.

She is unable to recall the

exact moment or act which initiated the accidental injury.
However, her candid admission of her inability does not preclude
recovery because the statutory requirements of "injury by
accident" are fulfilled by the accidental event of her ruptured
disc and the resulting injury of nerve impingement causing
pain.

Appellant is therefore, entitled to compensation.

For

this reason and those stated above, the Order of the Industrial
Commission should be reversed.
Respectfully Submitted,

Gordon J. Low
Attorney for Appellant
175 East First North
Logan , UT
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I hereby certify that I delivered copies of the
foregoing brief of appellant to the Industrial Commission
of Utahr and to George W. Preston, Attorney for Defendantf
this

day of June, 1976.

